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SOCIAL ENGINEERING IN NEW ZEALAND AND THE
UNITED STATES: A COMPARISON OF APPROACHES
TO TORT REFORM*
by

GEOFFREY

W.R.

PALMERt

Professor Geoffrey Palmer lectured at William Mitchell College of Law on November 19, 1977, during a day-long seminar
devoted to Commonwealth law. His participationhad been
sought because of his eminence in the field of New Zealand
compensation systems and his important advisory role in the
drafting of accident compensation legislationfor Australia. His
lecture proved to be both entertainingand thought-provoking.
Excerpts of it are presented here.
In this lecture, Professor Palmer voices his concern for the
pattern of selective reform of compensation systems that has
emerged in the United States. Not only has reform been piecemeal, but often it has been accomplished through the courts
rather than through legislatures. By contrastingNew Zealand's
approachto tort reform with the American approach, Professor
Palmer demonstrates the desirability-andthe political complexity-of reform that is thorough.

I.
In his classic treatise on the common law, Oliver Wendell
Holmes remarked that "[tihe state might conceivably make itself a mutual insurance company against accidents, and distribute the burden of its citizens' mishaps among all its members."'
Holmes did not favor such a step. State interference was an evil,
* Copyright 1978 by Geoffrey W.R. Palmer.

t Mr. Palmer is Professor of English and New Zealand Law at Victoria University of
Wellington. He received his B.A. in 1964 and his LL.B. in 1965 from Victoria University
of Wellington. In 1967, he received his J.D. from the University of Chicago, where he was
British Commonwealth Fellow. Mr. Palmer has taught torts at the University of Iowa and
the University of Virginia. In 1969, he wrote the New Zealand Government's White Paper
on the personal injury system, PersonalInjury-A Commentary on the Report of the Royal
Commission of Inquiry into Compensation for Personal Injury in New Zealand. He was
Principal Assistant to the Australian National Committee of Inquiry into Compensation
and Rehabilitation in Australia in 1973 and 1974. He has written articles including:
Abolishing the Personal Injury Tort System: The New Zealand Experience, 9 ALTA. L.
Rsv. 169 (1971); Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM.
J. Comp. L. 1 (1977); Compensationfor PersonalInjury: A Requiem for the Common Law
in New Zealand, 21 Am.J. Comp. L. 1 (1973); Inspired Tinkering Versus Holistic Social
Engineering: Jeffrey O'Connell and The American Tort System, 25 DRAKE L. REv. 893
(1976) (book review of J. O'CoNNETL, ENDING INSULT TO INJURY (1975)). He is the editor of
THE WELFARE STATE TODAY (1977).
1. O.W. HOLMES, THE COMMON LAw
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and universal insurance could be better and more cheaply accomplished by private enterprise, in his view. Ninety-seven years
after those views were published, many Americans could be found
who would be disposed to agree with them.
Despite widespread support for the rhetoric of individual responsibility in the United States, the expectations of Americans
concerning what their governments might do for them have
changed dramatically in the last fifty years. If one examines what
American governments actually do, it becomes apparent that a
great deal more government intrusion is tolerated than inspection
of the rhetoric would suggest. So strong have the pressures for
more government intervention become that the courts have not
been immune from them. The tension between the demand for
government intervention and the traditional suspicion of government appears to have led to covert and indirect social engineering
by the courts. The tendency shows up in cases involving compensation for personal injury.
For the victims of accidental injury, the common law system
of tort has always been an important source of compensation. The
system revolves around complicated columns of legal doctrine
based on the concept of fault.' A person who is negligent should
pay damages to the person injured by the negligence. In negligence judgments of American courts prior to about 1910, a conscientious effort can be discerned to implement the axiom "no liability without fault." It was too conscientious; many people who
were badly hurt received no compensation. There are those who
would argue that the development of the industrial might of
America required such laws regulating liability in those days.
One result of holding to principle was the growth and development of workers' compensation statutes which allowed injured
workers to recover limited benefits from their employers without
the need to demonstrate negligence. With the development of
mass use of the automobile, with negligence law as almost the
sole means of compensating the victims of road accidents, the
principles of negligence began to loosen up a little. Of course, with
the prominent part played by the jury in negligence litigation,
plaintiffs could always hope that sentiment and sympathy would
carry them over any obstacles the formal law of negligence
erected in their path. The judges became even bolder. In respect
to liability for dangerous and defective products, they developed
2. The idea sounds simple but for evidence that much law can grow up around it, see

W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToirrS (4th ed. 1971).
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liability which was not based on negligence at all. Led by the
judges of California,3 courts throughout the United States
adopted the law that manufacturers would be strictly liable for
injuries resulting from their products.
All this looks frightfully bold to a lawyer from the British Commonwealth. We do not expect judges to go around, at this point
in the history of the common law, inventing new and drastic
remedies with profound social effects. The judges may be able to
make some modest incremental changes, but restructuring the
whole law of products liability would be an inappropriate exercise
of the judicial power, we would tend to think.' Unkind common
lawyers, from where I come, might be disposed to suggest that the
development of the common law within the United States has
borrowed the techniques of constitutional litigation here, and
that American courts, in common law, seem to be veering towards
the legislative mode and away from the judicial mode of carrying
on their business.
The Supreme Court of California provides abundant evidence
to support my contention. Let us examine what the court did to
the defence of contributory negligence. It was decided in England
in 1809 that contributory negligence was a complete defence to
an action for negligence.5 That is to say, where the plaintiff's
injuries were caused partly by his own fault and partly by the
negligence of the defendant, he could not recover from the defendant for them. The proposition was little doubted anywhere in
the common law world for a hundred years.' There were a number
of exceptions to the rule, the most famous being that it did not
operate where the defendant had the last opportunity to avoid
harm.'
3. See, e.g., Horn v. General Motors Corp., 17 Cal. 3d 359, 551 P.2d 398,131 Cal. Rptr.
78 (1976) (in bank); Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co., 61 Cal. 2d 256, 391 P.2d 168, 37 Cal.
Rptr. 896 (1964) (in bank); Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d
897, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1962) (in bank); Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453,
150 P.2d 436 (1944) (in bank).
4. For an account by a former British judge as to the appropriate scope of lawmaking,
see Devlin, Judges and Lawmakers, 39 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1976).
5. Butterfield v. Forrester, 103 Eng. Rep. 926 (K.B. 1809) (per curiam).
6. Apparently there were some exceptions. Georgia adopted a form of comparative
negligence as early as 1855 and pure comparative negligence was adopted in Mississippi
as early as 1919. See C. GREGORY, H. KALVz & R. EPsrN, CASES AND MATmuR,,s ON ToRTS
433 (3d ed. 1977).
7. See, e.g., Davies v. Mann, 152 Eng. Rep. 588 (Exch. 1841). The most remarkable
application of the doctrine came in British Columbia Elec. Ry. v. Loach, [1916] 1 A.C.
719 (P.C. 1915) where the defendant was held liable, even though the plaintiff was contributorily negligent, because defendant had a last opportunity to avoid a collision except
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Criticism has been directed for many years against the principal rule, since it means that a defendant who can show that a
plaintiff has been partially to blame can avoid liability altogether. That, at least, was the theory. Juries often lessened the
rigour of the legal rule where it seemed to them appropriate to do
so. In some jurisdictions, including most of those in the British
Commonwealth, it was replaced many years ago by comparative
negligence statutes. Such legislation was passed in the United
Kingdom in 1945.1 In the seventies, many state legislatures in
America passed similar statutes.9 The same result was accomplished in California by judicial decision in 1975.10 The state legislature had made several prior attempts to change the rule, but
without success." The decision of the court offers remarkably few
reasons why comparative negligence was to be preferred to contributory negligence, and contains a rather dubious construction
of the California Civil Code provision concerning negligence. 2
The Supreme Court of California has made many reformist
forays into the doctrine of tort law, and few of them have brought
any joy to the hearts of defendants. The products liability
development has already been referred to. In 1968, the California
court abolished the time-honoured distinctions of the common
law between trespassers, licensees, and invitees as the means of
deciding the duties of the occupiers of land to persons coming
onto their property."1 Again, in the British Commonwealth, that
for previous negligence of not keeping the train brakes in good order.
8. Law Reform (Contributory Negligence) Act, 1945, 8 & 9 Geo. 6, c. 28. This statute
provides in part:
Where any person suffers damage as the result partly of his own fault and partly
of the fault of any other person or persons, a claim in respect of that damage
shall not be defeated by reason of the fault of the person suffering the damage,
but the damages recoverable in respect thereof shall be reduced to such an
extent as the court thinks just and equitable having regard to the claimant's
share in the responsibility for the damage ....
Id. § 1(1). Similiar legislation was passed in New Zealand in 1947. See Contributory
Negligence Act 1947, No. 3, 1947 Stat. N.Z. 29.
9. See V. SCHWARTZ, CoMPARATIvE NEGUGENC. § 1.1 (1974).
10. See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975)
(in bank). Florida also accomplished a similar result by judicial decision. See Hoffman v.
Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973). The Supreme Court of Illinois decided, reversing the
Illinois Appellate Court, that adoption of comparative negligence required legislative not
judicial action. See Maki v. Frelk, 40 fI1. 2d 193, 197, 239 N.E.2d 445, 447 (1968). For an
excellent discussion of the Li case, see Fleming, Foreword: Comparative Negligence at
Last-by Judicial Choice, 64 CAuF. L. Rxv. 239 (1976).
11. Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 810 n.1, 532 P.2d 1226, 1230 n.1, 119 Cal. Rptr.
858, 862 n.1 (1975) (in bank).
12. See id. at 813-23, 532 P.2d at 1232-39, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 864-71.
13. See Rowland v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 108, 443 P.2d 561, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1968) (in
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/2
bank).
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reform was made by statute."
To my admittedly un-American eye, the judicial reforming
trend goes further. When dealing with traditional rules of tort
law, upon which no explicit policy attack is made, the California
courts tend to stretch the law. I hesitate to use the word
"pervert." The aim appears to be to see that plaintiffs in personal
injury cases get paid for serious losses they have sustained where
the defendant sued has the money to pay. In some of these cases,
to assert that the defendant was to blame, in the sense that he
was at fault or that his conduct caused the harm, is not credible
to people of ordinary common sense. Let me mention two recent
decisions.
In one 1970 case, a father and his five-year-old son were staying
at a motel in Palm Springs. 5 The motel had a swimming pool. It
was the off-season and the motel was not crowded. The father and
son went for a swim. They were drowned under circumstances
which could not be explained because there were no eyewitnesses.
A California statute provided that, for swimming pools such as
the one the motel had, "lifeguard service shall be provided or a
sign shall be erected clearly indicating that such service is not
provided." The evidence showed that there was no lifeguard service and that there was no warning sign. The Supreme Court of
California was prepared to hold that the defendant had the burden of showing that the absence of the warning was not a cause
of the deaths. A verdict for the defendants given by the jury was
overturned, since the court held defendants had not met the burden. How any defendant could ever meet such a burden, the court
did not explain. A lawyer from the British Commonwealth would
regard that decision as nothing less than remarkable.
In a 1975 case, the Supreme Court of California was dealing
with a defendant radio station which had sponsored a contest
featuring a disc jockey." The disc jockey, the "Real Don Steele,"
was running a "Super Summer Spectacular" from a fire-enginered Buick automobile which he drove about the San Fernando
Valley. The person who first approached him at each location was
given an opportunity to win a small money prize by answering a
simple question. Messages would be broadcast that "the Real
14. See, e.g., Occupiers' Liability Act, 1957, 5 & 6 Eliz. 2, c. 31; Occupiers' Liability
Act 1962, No. 31, 1962 Stat. N.Z. 250.
15. Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 3 Cal. 3d 756, 478 P.2d 465, 91 Cal. Rptr. 745 (1970) (in
bank).
16. Weirum v. RKO Gen., Inc., 15 Cal. 3d 40, 539 P.2d 36, 123 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1975)
(inMitchell
bank). Hamline Open Access, 1978
Published by
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. ; could be in your neighborhood

at any time and he's got bread to spread, so be on the lookout for
him." Two teenagers listening to the broadcast had failed to
reach Steele at his prior location. When they heard his new location, they sped in two cars along the freeway in tandem at over
eighty miles per hour, forcing the decedent's car into a spin which
caused it to overturn, killing him. Plaintiff, in a wrongful death
action, secured a verdict from a jury against the radio station
which the supreme court upheld, even though the California
Court of Appeals had reversed on the ground that the radio station had no control or right of control over the drivers of cars on
the highway. The supreme court was "not persuaded that the
imposition of a duty here will lead to unwarranted extensions of
liability." It seems to me that theories of recovery against the
State of California for allowing such youths to drive at all, or
against their middle-class parents for allowing them to speed
about in potent machinery, would be just as persuasive. Perhaps
my skepticism is unfounded. In the peculiar environment of
southern California, it may be that nothing is unforeseeable.
It looks to me as if the courts have begun to try to turn the tort
system in the United States into a mutual insurance company
against accidents. It is certainly difficult, if not impossible, to
defend modem American tort law as a serious attempt to implement a system of recovery based on fault. In California, which in
so many ways represents the direction in which the rest of Western civilisation will travel, the feeling seems to be that, where
there is a serious loss, someone should be found who will pay for
it. So far as losses from accidental injuries are concerned, I find
the attitude acceptable. As a common lawyer, I find the means
by which it is implemented distressing. In the end, I do not think
that the aim can be accomplished through judicial initiatives by
the courts. Certainly it cannot be achieved in a principled and
orderly fashion by the sporadic method of common law adjudication." Indeed, the only reason it is being attempted through the
courts, I suspect, is that it is politically risky, not to say embarrassing, to pass legislation to pay money to people who are incapacitated by accident. It does not conform to the rhetoric of free
enterprise and individual responsibility.
Many states have passed no-fault statutes to improve the
17. Some American tort scholars share my concern. See, e.g., Henderson, Expanding
the Negligence Concept: Retreat from the Rule of Law, 51 IND. L.J. 467 (1976).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/2
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plight of those injured on the roads."8 Some of those statutes
remove part of the tort remedy in return for guaranteed benefits.
California has passed no such statute. Perhaps part of the explanation of the need to bend the rules of tort resides in that fact. It
may be that the California Supreme Court will find a way to
implement a no-fault scheme by judicial fiat, although if that
were done, I think the distinction between legislative and judicial
responsibilities would break down altogether. I offer the heretical
suggestion that social engineering in the United States might be
more successful if the courts did not try to relieve the strain of
outworn doctrines, but left the legislatures to take the burden.
Change would take longer, but it might be more thoroughgoing
when it came. Neither legislative nor judicial social engineering
in America ever seems to reach fundamentals in the incomemaintenance area. Everything seems to be a palliative. Let me
introduce to you another way to skin the rabbit.
Ii.
New Zealand, a country on three main islands in the South
Pacific, occupies the same area as the State of Colorado. It has
three million people of predominantly British stock, although ten
percent of the population is Polynesian. New Zealand has a unicameral legislature. Parliamentary elections must be held every
three years, and a very high proportion of the electorate votes.
There is no written constitution. New Zealand has cabinet government and very strong party discipline. That means the executive will get the legislation it wants through Parliament. Ministers will take the advice of their civil servants and get the approval of the government caucus. The legislation will come out
the same way it went in, unless the government makes a decision
to change it. It is extremely rare, almost unheard of, for a member
of Parliament to vote against his party in the House of Representatives. These constitutional facts make New Zealand a country
in which it is possible to make very big legislative changes easily,
with no possibility that any court will hold them unconstitutional. I might add one more observation, one which many Americans find particularly unpalatable: New Zealanders like the government to do things for them; they expect it; they are not afraid
of it.
18. For a catalogue of the legislation, see J. O'CoNNELL & R. HENDERSON, TORT LAW,
No-FAuLT AND BEYOND 278-85, apps. H-ElI (1975).
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In 1967 a Royal Commission, set up to consider the state of the
workers' compensation law in New Zealand, reported." It recommended abolition not only of workers' compensation but also
complete removal of the common law action for negligence for
personal injury. Twenty-four hour-a-day coverage for all accidents for everyone was the recommendation.
The fundamental principle adopted by the Royal Commission
was articulated in this way:20
[I]n the national interest, and as a matter of national obligation, the community must protect all citizens (including the self
employed) and the housewives who sustain them from the burden of sudden individual losses when their ability to contribute
to the general welfare by their work has been interrupted by
physical incapacity ....
There was to be a comprehensive and integrated approach to
personal injury. Benefits were to be earnings-related. They were
to be free of any means test. They were to be paid without proof
of fault. The only restriction was that compensation was not to
be paid for deliberately self-inflicted injuries. Such a wideranging plan obviously raised the question of the relationship of
the new accident plan to the rest of the social welfare incomemaintenance program in New Zealand. If incapacity arising from
injury became the responsibility of the community, why not sickness, unemployment, and all the rest on the same basis? The
Royal Commission answered that conundrum in this way:"
We are able to understand the logic of the argument, but the
proposal we have put forward is far-reaching and is designed to
remedy a situation which at present is the subject of attention
by unrelated processes which produce inconsistent and inadequate results. Moreover, there is a need for more statistical information in the area of sickness and disease before firm decisions could be taken as to the cost of a scheme which would
embrace incapacities arising from these causes.
This report of the Royal Commission on Compensation for Personal Injury-known as the Woodhouse Report after its chairman
Sir Owen Woodhouse-was presented in 1967 to a National
Government, the conservatives. Not surprisingly, the government
19. See generally ROYAL COMM'N OF INQUIRY,
(1967).

COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEW

ZEALAND

20. Id. para. 55.
21. Id. para. 290(b).

http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/2
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had some difficulty in digesting a report with such wide-ranging
ramifications.
In 1972 the New Zealand Parliament enacted the Accident
Compensation Act." At that time the Act covered all those injured in motor accidents and all those in employment, however
injured.23 In other words, it excluded only nonearners who did not
suffer injury on the road. The Labour Government came to office
in 1972 pledged to extend the Act to all nonearners. Extension
was accomplished by means of amending acts in 1973.24
On 1 April 1974, the accident compensation scheme started to
work. It is administered by an independent body, the Accident
Compensation Commission. The scheme has proceeded without
much public attention. It runs fairly smoothly and has done so
since its inception, with few signs of public dissatisfaction. 2 The
common law claim for damages for personal injury is dead. So is
workers' compensation. The new scheme, it was estimated, would
cost no more than the old fragmented and uncoordinated remedies. Three years of operation of the new scheme has justified that
prediction.
While consideration of the Woodhouse Report's recommendation was still continuing, the government established another
Royal Commission, this one on social security. In 1972, the very
year when a modified Woodhouse scheme finally reached the
statute book as the Accident Compensation Act, the Royal Commission on Social Security reported.26 These Royal Commissioners did not find themselves attracted to the wide-ranging
changes recommended by the Woodhouse Report. The benefits
for the accident scheme were earnings-related. They were paid
free of any means test. That approach clashed with a long tradition of welfare benefits in New Zealand. Old-age pensions had
22. Accident Compensation Act 1972, No. 43, 1973 Stat. N.Z. 521.
23. Compensation for earners is based on 80% of earnings up to a maximum of $15,600
per year, a figure which includes the entire earnings of a very large proportion of earners
in New Zealand. Earners may receive lump-sum benefits, too.
24. Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1973, No. 112, 1973 Stat. N.Z. 825; Accident Compensation Amendment Act 1973 (No. 2), No. 113, 1973 Stat. N.Z. 829.
The amendments allow nonearners to claim under a supplementary scheme which pays
lump sums of up to $17,000 for loss of bodily function, pain and suffering, and loss of
amenities, as well as medical and rehabilitation expenses. The nonearners do not receive
a periodic payment as the 1967 Woodhouse Report had recommended they should, but
they do receive lump sums.
25. See Palmer, Accident Compensation in New Zealand: The First Two Years, 25 AM.
J. COMP. L. 1 (1977).
26. See generally ROYAL COMM'N OF INQUIRY, SociAL SECURITY IN NEW ZEALAND (1972).
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been introduced in 1898. The tradition called for flat-rate benefits to be paid to those who had no other assets or income on
which to fall back. The Royal Commission on Social Security said
that it did not detect any widespread desire for radical change.,
It wanted the continuation of the mixture of selective and universal benefits which characterized the New Zealand system. 8
The Royal Commission was opposed to use of earnings-related
benefits across the board in the social security system. There was
no strong public demand for earnings-related schemes; the cost
of providing them would be far too high. Those who would stand
to benefit most would be those most able to provide for themselves. People providing for themselves should not be compelled
to be in a compulsory system, reasoned the Commissioners. People should be free to spend their income as they wish, without
having to contribute to the compulsory scheme. The exception
recommended was short-term sickness compensation, which was
justified on the grounds that sickness was usually of short duration and private provision for it was not usually made.29
The Royal Commission on Social Security also investigated the
position of the aged in some detail. At that time, social security
provided two types of income-maintenance programs for the
aged. Under one program, income-tested age benefits were payable from the age of sixty. Under a second program, universal
superannuation benefits (pensions) were payable at the age of
sixty-five, free of all income tests. Universal superannuation was
subject to taxation. There were residential qualifications for both
benefits. Both benefit rates were brought into parity in 1960 with
some differences for married couples.
The Royal Commission recommended the retention of both
benefits with the same age qualifications and other conditions
that existed at the time of its report. In particular, the Commission was opposed to universal benefits for all at the age of sixty.
This was despite the earlier opinion on the matter which had been
27. See id. 64.
28. The two main universal benefits were the family benefit, which the Commission
recommended be doubled to three dollars per week per child, and universal superannuation, a flat-rate benefit paid at age 65 to everyone. The selective benefits were for sickness,
invalids, widows, unemployment, and some other minor categories.
29. Sickness, it was said, often strikes during periods of higher earnings and higher
responsibilities. Because the duration of the incapacity is likely to be short, the earner
should not have to change his way of life to the extent that would be justifiable in the
case of permanent disability. Although most of the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Social Security were adopted, nothing was done about the earnings-related

sickness benefit.
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/2
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expressed in New Zealand in the 1930's, which the Commission
3
summarized in this way: 0
The views expressed in the 1930s (particularly those in the
1938 Parliamentary Select Committee) make it reasonably clear
that the Government envisaged that the superannuation benefit
would eventually be given at age 60 without a means test. In
effect, it would replace the selective age benefit. There seem to
have been two main arguments. Probably the most important
was that at a certain age people should gain rights to benefit by
virtue of their past contributions to tax revenue and production
irrespective of their means. But in addition, the strong opposition to traditional forms of means tests led to the view that need
for financial help could be assumed from the fact of age.
There had been insufficient money to do it in the 1930's. The
approach was rejected by the Royal Commission in 1972 because
it was thought the two benefits had somewhat different aims: the
one in response to need, the other as a reward to those who had
worked and served in the community for a long time. It would be
hard to increase the level of benefit if it were a universal one,
since the cost of doing so would be higher than under the dual
system.
Whatever the quality of its analysis, the Royal Commission
turned out to be a poor prophet. A little more than four years
later, exactly what it had recommended against reached the statute books. How it got there is a story rivalling accident compensation in its fascination.
For some years, the Labour Party had been floating ideas for
an improved superannuation scheme." In 1972 the party formulated a detailed policy which was a prominent plank in the
party's election platform that year. The proposals owed something to the earlier Woodhouse idea: the benefits under the proposed scheme were to be earnings-related. The scheme was occupationally based and contributory; there was no provision for
coverage of those who had not been members of the work force.
Contributions were to be made by employers and employees. The
key idea was to provide superannuation in a form which would
allow the employee to change his job without losing his superan30. ROYAL COMM'N OF INQUIRY, SOCIAL SECURITY IN Nzw ZEALAND 204 (1972).
31. For a detailed account of the events related here, see Booth, The National Party's
1975 Superannuation Policy, in THE WELFARE STATE TODAY 72 (G. Palmer ed. 1977);
Collins, Formulating SuperannuationPolicy: The Labour Party Approach, in THE WELFARE STATE TODAY 23 (G. Palmer ed. 1977).
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nuation rights. Benefits were to be protected against inflation. All
contributions were to be kept in a special fund, as a source of
investment capital in socially significant areas of the economy.
The prime emphasis in the preelection publicity was on the social
aspects of superannuation payments in assisting old people to
enjoy a higher standard of living.
On being elected the government in November 1972, Labour
took steps to formulate legislation to implement its superannuation policy. The first step was the establishment of a committee
of officials, almost always the key people in setting the details of
legislative policy in New Zealand. The original proposals underwent some important changes in the lengthy gestation period
before a bill was introduced in October 1973. Rather early in the
policy formulation process it was decided to abandon the possibility of implementing Labour's 1938 policy 32 of building up the level
of the universal superannuation benefit as a way to assist the
aged. In the end, a two-tier system was chosen. The existing flatrate universal superannuation was to remain at the first tier and
the new contributory superannuation scheme placed on top. This
formulation 33 finally received the royal assent on 26 August 1974
after it had been stoutly resisted in all its stages by the National
Opposition.
Labour's two-tier scheme had obvious advantages. It did not
increase ordinary taxation. All the working population would be
provided with increased income to support them in old age. The
accumulation of those rights would not be lost by a person changing jobs throughout his life. The amount of a benefit in the case
of a person who had worked forty years would reflect his earnings
and would accordingly ensure that the drop in the standard of
living upon retirement was not too drastic.
The scheme was also susceptible to some serious criticism. It
would be many years before full annuities would have accumulated and begun to be paid. Indeed, it would be well into the next
century. The contributions, on the other hand, would begin immediately. Nonearners were not included and that fact caused
resentment among the housewives and women's groups. A good
deal of administrative difficulty was involved: employers had to
make deductions and pay them to the fund. The massive size to
which the fund would eventually grow created much political
debate. The National Opposition said that the fund would be32. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
33. New Zealand Superannuation Act 1974, No. 41, 1974 Stat. N.Z. 992 (repealed 1976).
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come an economic octopus which would strangle free enterprise.
Labour said it would be a new source of money for beneficent
capital investment. From a political point of view, the Labour
scheme was hard to sell because it was complicated.
The whole superannuation issue had turned into a monumental
political battle. The National Opposition had opposed it at every
opportunity, attracting great amounts of publicity. National had
announced in March 1974, well before Labour's bill was passed,
that National proposed to devise an alternative policy. The numerous representations made to the Parliamentary Select Committee on Labour's bill had given National Members of Parliament plenty of political ammunition and some insights as to what
sort of policy to formulate. National promised to repeal the new
act if it became the government. At the 1975 general election,
National beat Labour, and its single most important positive
policy was superannuation.
The scheme advanced by the National Party was the essence
of simplicity.34 Ironically, the National scheme was virtually the
same as the 1938 Labour policy of replacing the social security age
benefit with a broad superannuation scheme.3 5 A married couple
of sixty years of age or over would receive eighty percent of the
average weekly wage in the community; a single person would
receive sixty percent of the married rhte. The benefit was to be
paid in equal amounts to each partner in the marriage. Benefits
were to be subject to income tax.
Whether National would have devised any superannuation policy at all in 1975, had it not been for Labour's legislation, must
remain a moot point. But as an exercise in how to make policy
on the rebound, National's effort resembled something approaching an art form. The feat was all the more amazing, since during
34. The first two paragraphs of the policy show how easy it was to understand:
The next National Government will abolish the present New Zealand Superanuation Scheme and replace it with a pay-as-you-go, flat-rate superannuation
financed out of ordinary government revenue.
The National Superannuation Scheme will pay retirement pensions to all
New Zealand residents of ten years standing who are aged 60 years or more. The
scheme will replace the present age benefit and superannuation.
Benefits under the new scheme will be available as of right and will not be
subject to any means test or income test and will provide substantially higher
cash-in-hand payments to those over 60 who are presently receiving State benefits.
NEW ZEALAND NATIONAL PARTY, A NATIONAL PARTY POuCY STATEMENT: SUPERANNUATION
(June 24, 1975).
35. See note 30 supra and accompanying text.
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the election campaign National stressed the poor state of the
economy. Yet on the National Party's own figures, spending on
welfare cash benefits was to be increased by thirty-five percent
as the result of the superannuation proposals and expenditure on
the aged would go up by almost fifty-eight percent.
National's scheme was simple to understand in contrast to
Labour's, which was complex. National's scheme paid benefits
quickly, in contrast to Labour's, which would delay them. National's scheme was aimed at helping the aged and nothing else,
whereas Labour's scheme suffered from a confusing duality of
purpose. That is not to say that National's was the best policy,
although it might have been. It was certainly the easiest to sell.
On any view of the matter, the new superannuation scheme
amounted to a massive injection of money into the hands of the
aged. The scheme was implemented rapidly after the election.3
Payments began early in 1977.
So New Zealand now has three basic income-maintenance systems. For all victims of injury, accident compensation benefits
are paid. These are earnings-related for those with earnings. They
are paid free of any means test. Those couples who survive to the
age of sixty receive eighty percent of the average weekly earnings
of the community free of any means test. The benefits of both
accident compensation and national superannuation are subject
to tax. For the rest-the sick, the invalids, the solo parents, and
the unemployed-flat-rate benefits are paid subject to an income
test. The rate of those benefits is significantly lower than those
of national superannuation.
In the New Zealand government estimates of expenditure in
the year ending 31 March 1978, money for income maintenance
took up thirty percent of government expenditure. The total outlay for income maintenance was estimated at $1493.5 million.
National had said that its superannuation scheme would cost
$275 million per annum in new money. The total cost estimated
for 1978 was $930 million before the taxation clawback. By comparison, the accident compensation scheme's estimated cost for
the same year was about $100 million. Accidental injury forms a
relatively small part of the income-maintenance problem.3
36. Social Security Amendment Act 1976, No. 40, 1976 Stat. N.Z. 432.
37. The following table from the Estimates of Expenditure for the Government of New
Zealand for the year ending 31 March 1978 shows the allocation of dollars to be spent on
income maintenance.
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Prior to 1972, the social security flat-rate, income-tested system had been the foundation of the income-maintenance system
in New Zealand. For the fortunate few, there were common law
damages, and for those injured at work there was workers' compensation. In 1972 the comprehensive injury scheme was enacted.
In 1976 the new superannuation scheme was passed.38 Within five
years the basic pattern of New Zealand's income-maintenance
program had been turned on its ear.
It does not require a great prescience to discern what the main
welfare issue in the 1978 election will be. The cry will be to bring
the sick and the invalids into parity with the injured and the
old. To bring the whole of the income-maintenance system in
New Zealand into line, it is likely to cost even more money. It will
need to be done in conjunction with the taxation system. For too
long, social welfare benefits in New Zealand have been considered
in isolation from the general policies of taxation. It is now time
to bring them together. Making accident compensation payments
and national superannuation benefits taxable is a step in the
right direction. Properly employed, the graduated income tax can
serve the function of a means test more efficiently and with less
invasion of individual dignity and privacy than the traditional
tests.
The idea that income-maintenance benefits should be earnings-related is not one that has attracted widespread support
in social welfare circles hitherto. The case was put in the New
3
Zealand Woodhouse Report this way:
The losses of individuals vary greatly and so do their continuing
commitments. A fair part of their different losses and a fair part
of their sudden problems will not be relieved by a system which
ignores lost earnings in favour of a general average of assistance.
Expenditure on Income Maintenance in New Zealand
$ Million
National Superannuation
Social Security Benefits: widows, sickness, invalids, domestic
purposes, family benefit, unemployment
War Pensions
Accident Compensation
TOTAL

930.
387.4
66.1
100.
1483.5

38. Superannuation Schemes Act 1976, No. 3, 1976 Stat. N.Z. 12.

39.

ROYAL COMM'N OF INQUIRY, COMPENSATION FOR PERSONAL INJURY IN NEw ZEALAND

para. 250 (1967).
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The only way in which a comprehensive system of compensation
could operate equitably is by linking benefits to earning capacity and by taking into account permanent physical disability.
Implicit in that idea is the view that everyone lives up to their
income, whatever it is. For the great proportion of earners that is
probably true, especially in New Zealand, where taxation rates
are high and earnings occur within a relatively narrow band. The
approach taken in the superannuation scheme, using community
average earnings rather than the individual's actual earnings, can
be defended on the basis that the community's responsibility to
the aged is a different one than to those in their working years
who are suddenly incapacitated.
In any event, the approach to income maintenance now being
adopted in New Zealand makes it clear that the welfare state is
for everyone. The schemes discussed take welfare into middle
classes. To that extent, they look a little like social insurance.
Most people in the community pay taxes. Everyone is eligible for
the benefits. Those in high tax brackets feel they have a real
stake in the programmes.
III.
You may be wondering what connection my remarks on American tort law at the beginning have to the development of income
maintenance in New Zealand. In these brief concluding remarks,
I hope the relationship will become evident.
Reform of the law of torts has profound implications for the
pattern of social welfare. It is not feasible to abolish the common
law, even for the limited number of people who have access to it,
unless what is offered in substitution gives roughly comparable
benefits. The removal of the common law begins a reform movement which threatens the capture of the entire incomemaintenance system. If all people who suffer accidental personal
injury secure earnings-related benefits free of any means test
from a state organized as a mutual insurance company, the pattern of all forms of income maintenance must be considered. It
will become increasingly difficult to defend a multitude of mixed
systems offering different benefits and hedged around with different qualifying conditions. The person who loses a leg from cancer
must be treated on a basis comparable to the person who loses a
leg in a car crash.
The irrationality and confusion resulting from the mixed systems within the United States has caused President Carter to
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss2/2
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propose a massive change to the welfare system. The federal programmes in the United States exhibit different standards, lack a
common definition of need, and apply different procedures for
assessing income. As the official announcement of the new programme observed, "[t]he complexity heightens the chance of
fraud, abuse and error, increases administrative costs, and bewilders caseworker and recipient alike."" In my view, however, the
complexity of the new proposals will make them incomprehensible to those they are designed to help. Much bolder initiatives
will be required to rescue American income maintenance from its
fragmented character, such a fertile mother of social injustices.
My impatience with American initiatives to implement limited
no-fault insurance stems from the failure of those proposals to
address the income-maintenance problem as a whole. These
schemes threaten to add to an already confused and overly complex picture. It is time for Americans to decide what they are
trying to do in the income-maintenance area and do it as simply
as possible.
To be sure, a pattern of social engineering which can work in
New Zealand will not function in the United States. The climate
in the United States is not conducive to large-scale social engineering. The reformer exhausts himself persuading the rat to sniff
the cheese; actually catching the rat seems an impossible dream.
So it is not attempted. I have heard from my American friends
the multitude of reasons why big changes cannot or should not
be contemplated. For myself, I think you could do a little better.
You are very wealthy. Why not spend a little more on people?
40. U.S. DEP'T
Aug. 18, 1977).
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